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KnowledgeThe formality of contracts is not external to the substance of business interactions, but a way of articulating,
facilitating and simplifying the complexity of business interactions. An umbrella contract, in particular, is an
abstraction of possibility and a refined version of the substance of business interaction in which resource
leveraging may or may not occur. Umbrella contracts circumscribe an in-built platform or ‘architecture’ that
enables regular and repeated knowledge-intensive interactions. Today's business landscape is characterized
by the heterogeneity of resources, activities and actors and contracts have become a key element in the inter-
connected path of resource evolution, activity specialization and actor co-evolution.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Carl Johan Hatteland's commentary on “Leveraging knowledge-
based resources: the role of contracts” (2011) is both inspiring and
thought-provoking. The commentary acknowledges that the study
(Mouzas & Ford, 2011) is an important step in linking ideas of business
contracts and resource interaction in relational settings. The com-
mentary argues that the findings provide new and valuable insight
into the role of contracts in business relationships in general and
the leveraging of knowledge-based resources in particular. Simulta-
neously, the commentary expresses new and relevant questions
that require the development of new avenues of inquiry.
The core of Hatteland's commentary is that the article consigns
contracts into a rather large and unspecified category of contextual
factors that are external to a relationship, but that in this case may
influence the relationship by leveraging knowledge-based resources
(Hatteland, 2011). This view relates to the commonly held beliefs
that a contract is a formal device which is external to the substance
of business interactions and that the primary function of a contract
is to control a counterpart. However, the formality of contracts is
not external to the substance of business interactions, but a way of
articulating, preserving and facilitating that substance (Stinchcombe,
2001).ess School, France; and Peter
or valuable comments and
zas),
rights reserved.An umbrella contract, in particular, is an abstraction of possibility;
a refined version of this substance. This means that umbrella con-
tracts circumscribe an in-built platform, where common knowledge
may or may not occur through interaction among counterparts. For
this reason, the same platform used by different contracting actors
may result in different resource combinations in different interaction
processes (Ford, Gadde, Håkansson, & Snehota, 2011; Håkansson,
Ford, Gadde, Snehota, & Waluszewski, 2009). Thus, the primary func-
tion and concern of contracts in continuing relationships marked by
recurrent interactions is not that of counterpart-control or the detec-
tion of deceit or betrayal. Instead, contracts are part of the process of
leveraging knowledge-based resources to facilitate the creation of
joint gains and thus improve the competiveness of both counterparts
in a business relationship (Collins, 2009). For example, consider the
umbrella contract between Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble, in which
Procter &Gamble serves as “category captain,” a termequivalent to pre-
ferred supplier. In this contract, Procter & Gamble as category captain
transfers industry knowledge to Wal-Mart with regard to a specific
category of products, e.g. market research, product specification, con-
sumer data etc. and in return,Wal-Mart transfers ‘retail’ knowledge to
Procter & Gamble with regard to “shopper insight” connected with
scanner data at the point of sale.
Do contracts requirements include setting-up resource interfaces,
or can they be organized by more informal channels? Undoubtedly,
actors may choose to organize their resource interfaces in more infor-
mal ways. Why then do companies opt for formality? Business actors
choose to formalize the agreements with their counterparts for two
compelling reasons.
First, today's business interaction reveals multiple levels of inter-
face (Håkansson, 1982) and resource combination between different
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centers such as business units or distributors and different front-line
sales managers and buyers (Mouzas, 2006). Thus, contracts are useful
because they institutionalize the multiplicity of interfaces by creating
a shared understanding in the sense of shared mind-set based on a set
of reference points (Fehr, Hart, & Zehnder, 2011; Hart & Moore, 2008).
Contracts also secure commitments, especially when actors change or
when relevant playersmovewithin organizations. In thisway, contracts
create the ‘architecture’ that enables regular and repeated knowledge-
intensive interactions.
Second, the enforceability of informal agreements remains ex-
tremely limited. Notwithstanding the existence of ‘self-enforcing’
agreements that involve non-legal sanctions such as reputation costs
or the loss of relationship-specific assets (Charny, 1990; Levin, 2003;
Scott, 2003), contemporary business agreements are manifested in
legally enforceable contracts. For this reason, sellers and buyers need
to formalize their agreements and they need to draw on the expertise
of corporate lawyers or legal departments to formulate force-majeure
clauses, exit terms or termination clauses. The need for formality is
demonstrated vividly in an extensive analysis of relational contracts
in US courts (see Schwartz, 1992) and the leading case in the United
Kingdom (Baird Textile Holdings Limited vs. Marks & Spencer plc.,
2001) where senior English judges vigorously rejected any attempt to
enforce any informal, non-contractual agreements (Blois, 2003;
Harrison, 2004; Mellahi, Jackson, & Sparks, 2002)
Are umbrella contracts specific to this particular kind of industry,
or do they apply across industries? An inspection of the existing con-
tractual agreements in several industries such as financial services,
banking, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, manufacturing and retailing
shows that umbrella contracts mirror the reality of business relation-
ships today because companies are not concerned with immediate
contractual decisions. Instead, they are concerned with the explicit
framework of norms within which contractual decisions can be made
(Mouzas & Ford, 2006; Mouzas & Furmston, 2008).
The common denominator of all these industries is not that end-
customers are shared, but that interaction among counterparts is regular,
for example, in the formof annual negotiations and quarterly ormonthly
business reviews. For this reason, umbrella contracts are a signal that
products or services are ordered regularly from a supplier or are sold
regularly to a customer.
Hatteland (2011) raises the question of whether something could
be imbued in the contractual arrangement to make a specific relation-
ship increasingly exclusive and dedicated. The answer is that there is
no evidence that supports this suggestion. Despite the widespread
use of exclusivity clauses, exclusive and dedicated relationships are
more likely to be a function of the ability of counterparts to either create
joint value or exercise available alternative options in their surrounding
networks. This proposition links with two important implications: the
first is that umbrella contracts do not pre-determine future selection
processes. Ordering processes, for example, may vary from region to
region or from outlet to outlet; and will finally be determined by the
evolving customer demand. The second implication is that an ‘architec-
ture’ that enables regular and repeated knowledge-intensive interac-
tions does not imply that this consensus is necessarily a long-term
contract. The ability to sustain the creation of joint value and the inherent
competition within a network of relationships will determine whether a
specific business relationship will remain exclusive and dedicated.
The commentary (Hatteland, 2011) questions whether umbrella
contracts are primarily about expressing joint consent to share infor-
mation about a range of products leading to the development of
resource interfaces or simply for swapping information in return for
discounts. Discounts or trade allowances are the significant resources
that manufacturers exchange in return for the shelf space (also a re-
source) that retailers may offer for manufacturers' products. The
study (Mouzas & Ford, 2011) suggests that umbrella contracts are
not concerned with specific exchanges, such as swapping informationfor discounts. Instead, umbrella contracts are concerned with the
explicit framework of norms within which exchanges and wider
interaction may or may not take place. In this way, umbrella contracts
may represent a joint consent that regulates the use of trade allow-
ances and information exchange. This is demonstrated in umbrella
agreements between manufacturers and retailers to implement Effi-
cient Consumer Response (ECR) in complex manufacturer–retailer
networks. Specifically, leading fast-moving consumer goods manu-
facturers used trade allowances as an incentive to promote Electronic
Data Interchange with retailers that initially were reluctant to engage
in such an exchange process (Mouzas & Araujo, 2000).
The Industrial Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group provides a
large number of wide ranging international studies into management in
complex business networks, such as those that involve manufacturer–
retailer relationships, manufacturer–supplier relationships or service-
provider relationships. The group's interaction approach is based on
the importance for both researchers and managers of understanding
these complex business networks and the interaction between active
buyers and sellers in continuing business relationships. Active buyers
and sellers embrace umbrella contracts in their business relationships
because they simplify, speed up and facilitate the complex process
of business interaction as many of the stratified procedures are pre-
defined in the contract.
The study (Mouzas & Ford, 2011) does not explicitly address the
views of resources containedwithin earlier IMP research that Hatteland
mentions. However, the view of resources on which the article is based
is congruentwith themost recent IMP articulation of ideas on resources
(Ford et al., 2011; Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2002, 2007; Håkansson
et al., 2009; Naude, Salle, Michel, & Valla, 2003). In particular, this
view emphasizes the heterogeneity of business resources (and of ac-
tivities and actors themselves) in network space. More importantly,
this view of resource heterogeneity would see contracts as a key ele-
ment in the interconnected path of resource evolution, activity spe-
cialization and actor co-evolution.
In conclusion, Hatteland's commentary is an insightful critique of
the paper on the role of contracts on leveraging knowledge-based
resources (Mouzas & Ford, 2011). The commentary expands the con-
tractual perspective and incorporates new relevant questions and
opens new avenues of inquiry on resource evolution. Further business
research needs to include the investigation of how contracts build on
the resource heterogeneity that is inherent in business networks to
pave the way of counterparts' inter-action and co-evolution.
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